In the trust-structure model of trust management, principals specify their trusting relationships with other principals in terms of trust policies. In their paper on trust structures, Carbone et al. present a language for such policies, and provide a suitable denotational semantics. The semantics ensures that for any collection of trust policies, there is always a unique global trust-state, compatible with all the policies, specifying everyone's degree of trust in everyone else. However, as the authors themselves point out, the language lacks an operational model: the global trust-state is a well-defined mathematical object, but it is not clear how principals can actually compute it. This becomes even more apparent when one considers the intended application environment: vast numbers of autonomous principals, distributed and possibly mobile. We provide a compositional operational semantics for a language of trust policies. The operational semantics is given in terms of a composition of I/O automata. We prove that this semantics is faithful to its corresponding denotational semantics, in the sense that any run of the I/O automaton "converges to" the denotational semantics of the policies. Furthermore, as I/O automata are a natural model of asynchronous distributed computation, the semantics leads to an algorithm for distributedly computing the trust-state, which is suitable in the application environment.
Introduction
The trust-structure framework was introduced by Carbone, Nielsen and Sassone as a formal model for trust management in global computing environments [2] . In the framework, principals use "trust" as a means for decision-making about other principals. Trust is defined formally in terms of a trust structure T , of which a sub-component is a set D of so-called trust values. These trust values, specify the set of possible degrees of trust (or dis-trust) that a principal may have in another. As a simple example D = {high, mid, low, unknown} could be a set of trust values, but certainly trust values may have a much richer structure. A principal's trust in other principals is given by its trust policy. In a very simple setting, a trust policy could be a function of type P → D where P is the set of principal identities, i.e., mapping each principal identity to a trust value. However, in the intended global scenario, principals will often want to specify their trust contingent on the knowledge of some thirdparty (often having more detailed information about the subject). This feature is known as delegation in traditional trust management systems, and in the trust structure framework, it is called policy referencing. The idea is simple: principals may specify trust policies that refer to other principal's trust policies. Semantically, this means that trust policies are now functions mapping global trust-states gts : P → P → D to local trust-states lts : P → D.
Trust policies are used for making decisions regarding interaction with other principals. At a high level, the intended mechanism is the following. When principal p needs to make a decision about whether and how to interact with another principal q, principal p will make this decision based on its trust value for q. Hence p must somehow obtain its trust value for q, e.g., by computing this value, or by looking it up in a precomputed store. Note that, because of policy references, principals generally need trust information from other principals to perform such a computation. Since principals are distributed, a computation of trust values becomes a distributed problem. The contribution of this paper is a solution to the problem of distributed trust-value computation. At first sight, this might seem trivial: when p needs to know about q's value for some principal, this value is simply sent. However, q's value may itself depend on other principal's trust policies, including p, which potentially gives cyclic dependencies. Semantically, this problem is elegantly solved by using domain theory, known from programming language semantics [11] . Essentially, the theory ensures that mutually recursive trust policies have a unique "least" solution. However, the theory gives no clue as to how principals can actually compute the trust values.
In the following, we present in more detail the trust-structure framework, explaining how the problem of cyclic trust policies is solved. Before presenting our actual contribution, we motivate further why computing the trust values is a non-trivial problem, especially in a global computing environment.
The trust-structure framework
In the framework of trust structures [2] , trust is something which exists between pairs of principals; it is quantified and asymmetric in that we care of "how much" or "to what degree" principal p trusts principal q, which may not be to the same degree that q trusts p. Each application instance of the framework defines a so-called trust structure, T = (D, , ), which consists of a set D of trust values, together with two partial orderings of D, the trust ordering ( ) and the information ordering ( ). The elements c, d ∈ D express the levels of trust that are relevant for the particular instance, and c d means that d denotes at-least as high a trust degree as c. The information ordering introduces a notion of precision or refinement: c d is intended to mean that c may be refined into d (given more information). As a simple example of a trust structure, consider the so-called "MN" trust-structure T MN [5] . In this structure, trust values are pairs (m, n) of natural numbers, representing m + n interactions with a principal; each interaction classified as either "good" or "bad". In a trust value (m, n), the first component, m, denotes the number of "good" interactions, and the second, the number of "bad" ones. The information-ordering is given by: (m, n) (m , n ) only if one can refine (m, n) into (m , n ) by adding zero-or-more good interactions, and, zero-or-more bad interactions, i.e., iff m ≤ m and n ≤ n . In contrast, the trust ordering is given by: (m, n) (m , n ) only if m ≤ m and n ≥ n . For more examples of trust structures, see Carbone et al. [2] , and Nielsen and Krukow [5, 9] .
Global trust-states. Given a fixed trust structure T = (D, , ), and a set P of principal identities; a global trust-state of the system is a function gts : P → P → D. The interpretation is that gts represents the trust state where p's trust in q (formalized as an element of D) is given by gts(p)(q). A good way of thinking about gts is to consider it a large matrix, indexed by pairs of principal identities, in which the row indexed by principal p (denoted gts(p)) contains principal p's trust in any other principal. For example, in the row gts(p), column q represents p's trust in q, given as an element in the set D; this entry is denoted gts(p)(q) ("row vectors" like gts(p) are also called local trust-states). Thus, the matrix gts gives a complete (system global) description of how everyone trusts everyone else. We shall write GTS for the set of global trust-states P → P → D. Similarly we write LTS for the set P → D of local truststates (corresponding to rows of gts matrices).
Trust policies. The goal of the trust-structure framework is to define, at any time, a global trust state gts, thus giving a precise meaning to "p's trust in q" as the trust value gts(p)(q). In order to uniquely define the global trust state gts, an approach similar to that of Weeks [10] is adopted. Each principal p ∈ P defines a trust policy which is a func-tion π p of type GTS → LTS, i.e. taking a global matrix as input, and providing a local row-vector as output. This function then determines p's trust-row within the unique global trust-matrix, i.e. determines row gts(p), as follows. In the simplest case, π p could be a constant function, ignoring its first argument gts : P → P → D. As an example, π p (gts) = λq.t 0 (for some t 0 ∈ D) defines p's trust in any q ∈ P as the constant t 0 . In general we allow a form of delegation called policy reference: policy π p may refer to other policies (π z , z ∈ P), e.g., p might trust q to download if A or B trusts q to download. The general interpretation of π p is the following. Given that all principals assign trust-values as specified in the global trust-state gts, then p assigns trust values as specified in vector π p (gts) : P → D. For example, function π p (gts)(q) = (gts(A)(q) ∨ gts(B)(q)) ∧ download, represents a policy saying "for any q ∈ P, the trust in q is the least upper-bound of what A and B say, but no more than the constant download." 1 Unique trust-state. The collection of all trust policies, Π = (π p |p ∈ P), thus "spins a global web-of-trust" in which the trust policies mutually refer to each other. Since trust policies Π may give rise to cyclic policyreferences, it is not a priori clear how to define the unique global truststate gts for a given collection of trust policies Π. One may consider the unique function Π λ = π p |p ∈ P , of type GTS → GTS with the property that Proj p • Π λ = π p for all p ∈ P, where Proj p is the p'th projection. 2 Intuitively, the function Π λ is easy to understand: each π p maps a matrix gts ∈ GTS to a "row-vector" π p (gts) in LTS; on input gts, function Π λ builds the output matrix from all these rows by taking the p'th row of the output matrix to be π p (gts). We can now state a minimal requirement that the unique trust state, gts, should satisfy: gts should be consistent with all policies π p . This amounts to requiring that it should satisfy the following fixed-point equation: gts(p) = π p (gts) for all p ∈ P; or equivalently: Π λ (gts) = gts Any matrix gts : GTS satisfying this equation is consistent with the policies (π p |p ∈ P), i.e. row p of gts is consistent with π p in that, if all principals trust as specified in gts, then p trusts as specified in π p (gts) which (by the fixed-point equation) can be read-off as the pth row of gts. This means that any fixed point of Π λ is consistent with all policies π p . But arbitrary functions Π λ , may have multiple or even no fixed points.
Here we appeal to the power of the mathematical theory of complete partial orders and continuous functions, used e.g. in formal programming language semantics [11] . A crucial requirement in the trust-structure framework is that the information ordering makes (D, ) a complete partial order (cpo) with a least element (this element is denoted ⊥ , and can be thought of as a value representing "unknown"). We require also that all policies π p : GTS → LTS are information continuous, i.e. continuous with respect to . 3 Since this implies that Π λ is also informationcontinuous, and since (GTS, ) is a cpo with bottom, standard theory [11] tells us that Π λ has a (unique) least fixed-point which we denote lfp Π λ (or simply lfp Π λ ):
This global trust-state has the property that it is a fixed-point (i.e., Π λ (lfp Π λ ) = lfp Π λ ) and that is is the (information-) least among fixedpoints (i.e., for any other fixed point gts, lfp Π λ gts). Hence, for any collection Π of trust policies, we can define the global trust-state induced by that collection, as gts = lfp Π λ , which is well-defined by uniqueness. Consider now two mutually referring functions π p and π q , given by π p (gts) = Proj q (gts), and π q (gts) = Proj p (gts). Intuitively, there is no information present in these functions; p delegates all trust-questions to q, and similarly q delegates to p. In this case, we would like the global trust-state gts induced by the functions to take the value ⊥ on any entry z ∈ P for both p and q, i.e., for both x = p and x = q and for all z ∈ P we should have gts(x)(z) = ⊥ . This is exactly what is obtained by choosing the information-least fixed-point of Π λ .
The operational problem
Many interesting systems are instances of the trust-structure framework [2, 5, 9] , but one could argue against its usefulness as a basis for the actual construction of trust-management systems. In order to make security decisions, each principal p will need to reason about its trust in others, that is, the values of gts(p). While the framework does ensure the existence of a unique (theoretically well-founded) global trust-state, it is not "operational" in the sense of providing a way for principals to actually compute the trust values. Furthermore, as we shall argue in the following, the standard way of computing least fixed-points is inadequate in our scenario.
When the cpo (D, ) is of finite height h, the cpo (P → P → D, ) has height |P| 2 · h (the height of a cpo is the size of its longest chain). In this case, the least fixed-point of Π λ can, in principle, be computed by finding the first identity in the chain of approximants (λp.λq.⊥ ) [11] . However, in the environment envisioned, such a computation is infeasible. The functions (π p : p ∈ P) defining Π λ are distributed throughout the network, and, more importantly, even if the height h is finite, the number of principals |P|, though finite, will be very large. Furthermore, even if resources were available to make this computation, we can not assume that any central authority is present to perform it. Finally, since each principal p defines its trust policy π p autonomously, an inherent problem with trying to compute the fixed point is the fact that p might decide to change its policy π p to π p at any time. Such a policy update would be likely to invalidate data obtained from a fixed-point computation done with global function Π λ , i.e., one might not have time to compute lfp Π λ before the policies have changed to Π .
While the above discussion indicates that exact computation of the fixed point is infeasible (and hence that the framework is not suitable as an operational model), in many applications, it is often sufficient to merely approximate the fixed-point value. Krukow and Twigg present a collection of techniques for approximating the idealized fixed-point lfp Π λ [6] . Among these techniques is an asynchronous algorithm which distributedly computes the least fixed-point of a collection of policies, assuming that these policies remain fixed throughout the computation. While Krukow and Twigg argue that the algorithm is correct at an abstract level, there is a logical gap between the algorithm-description and the abstract model of reasoning; and the algorithm itself is described with an informal "pseudo-notation" which doesn't have a formal semantics.
Contribution and Structure. The purpose of this report is to make precise the mentioned distributed algorithm, and to "fill the logical gap." More precisely, we describe a general language for specifying trust poli-cies, and provide it with a compositional operational semantics. The semantics of a collection of policies will be defined by translation into an I/O automaton [7, 8] , formalizing the asynchronous distributed algorithm of Krukow and Twigg [6] in a semantic model. Our main theorem (Theorem 5.1) proves in this formal model, that even in infinite height cpos the I/O automata will converge towards the least fixed-point, as intended.
As mentioned, the semantics of policies is given in terms of I/O automata, and there are two main reasons for this. First, I/O automata are a natural model of asynchronous distributed algorithms which results in relatively simple automata for describing the fixed-point algorithm. Secondly, the model is operational and relatively low-level, which means that there is a short distance between the semantic model and an actual implementation that can run in real distributed systems. However, the relatively complex reasoning about the algorithm is best done at a more abstract level, and hence we introduce the more abstract model of Bertsekas Abstract Asynchronous Systems (BAASs), together with a "simulation-like" relation from the concrete I/O automata to the BAAS. Although the main theorem does not mention the abstract model, its proof uses this model together with the "simulation," to prove its statement about the actual operational semantics.
A Basic Language for Trust Policies
In this section we present a simple language for writing trust policies. The language is similar to that of Carbone et al. [2] , but simplified slightly. We provide a denotational semantics for the language which is similar to the denotational semantics of Carbone et al. Throughout this paper we let P be a finite set of principal identities, and (D, , ) be a trust structure.
Syntax
We assume a countable collection of n'ary function symbols op i n for each n > 0. These are meant to denote functions op i n den : D n → D, continuous with respect to . The syntax of our simple language is given in Figure 1 . A policy π is essentially a list of pairs p : τ , where p is a principal identity, and τ is an expression defining the policy's trustspecification for p. Since we cannot assume that the writer of the policy π ::= : τ (default policy, ∈ P) | p : τ, π (specific policies, p ∈ P) knows all principals, we include a generic construct : τ , which intuitively means "for everyone not mentioned explicitly in this policy, the trust specification is τ ." Note this could easily be extended to more practical constructs, say G : τ meaning that τ is the trust-specification for any member of the group G.
The syntactic category τ represents trust specifications. In this language, the category is very general and simple. We have constants d ∈ D, which are meant to be interpreted as themselves, e.g., p : d means "the trust in p is d." Construct p?q is the policy reference; it is meant to refer to "principal p's trust in principal q", e.g., r : p?q says that "the trust in r is what-ever p's trust in q is." Finally op i n (τ 1 , . . . , τ n ) is the application of operator op i n den to the trust specifications (τ 1 , . . . , τ n ). For example, if (D, ) is a lattice, this could be the n'ary least upper bound (provided this is continuous with respect to ).
We say that a policy is well-formed if there are no double occurrences of a principal identity, say, p : τ and p : τ . We assume that all policies are well-formed throughout this paper.
Denotational semantics
The denotational semantics of the basic policy language is given in figures 2, 3 and 4. We assume that for each of the function symbols op i n , op i n den is a -continuous function of type D n → D. The semantics follows the ideas of Carbone et al., presented in the introduction. For a collection Π = (π p | p ∈ P), the semantics of each π p is an informationcontinuous function π p den of type GTS → LTS. As expected, the denota-
else π den gts q Figure 2 : Denotational semantics of the policy language. For syntactic category π, π den is a continuous function of type (P → P → D) → P → D. The term id P denotes the identity function on P.
. . , τ n den env Figure 3 : Denotational semantics of the policy language. For syntactic category τ , when env is an environment, i.e., a function of type P ∪{ } → P then τ den env is a continuous function of type (P → P → D) → D.
tional semantics of the collection Π is the least fixed-point of the function Π λ = π p den | p ∈ P .
Two Models of Distributed Computation
In this section, we describe two models of distributed computation. The models will be used in the next sections, where we provide an operational semantics for the basic policy language of Section 2. The operational semantics is given by two translations into the respective structures of each of these models. More specifically, in the operational semantics, a principal-indexed collection of policies Π is translated into an I/O Automaton, denoted Π op . I/O Automata are a form of labeled transitionsystem, suitable for modelling and reasoning about distributed discrete (π p | p ∈ P) den = lfp π p den | p ∈ P event systems [7, 8] . We shall define also another translation Π op-abs into what we call a Bertsekas Abstract Asynchronous System (BAAS). There will be a tight correspondence between the "abstract" operational semantics Π op-abs and the actual operational semantics Π op . The reason for introducing · op-abs is to make reasoning about the actual operational semantics easier. More specifically, we will make use of a general convergence result of Bertsekas for BAAS's. By virtue of the connection between the semantics, this result translates into a result about the runs of the concrete I/O automaton Π op . We now present the I/O automaton model, and the Bertsekas abstract systems.
The I/O automata model
We review the basic definitions of I/O automata. For a more in-depth treatment, we refer to Lynch's book [7] . An I/O automaton is a (possibly infinite) state automaton, where transitions are labeled with so-called actions. There are three types of actions: input, output and internal. An important feature of I/O automata is that input-actions are always enabled. This property means that while the automaton can put restrictions on when output and internal actions are performed, it cannot control when input actions are performed. Instead, this is controlled by the environment.
An action signature S is given by a set acts(S) of actions, and a partition of this set into three sets in(S), out(S) and int(S) of input, output and internal actions, respectively. We denote by local (S) = out(S) ∪ int(S) the set of locally controlled actions.
Definition 3.1 (I/O Automaton). An input/output automaton A, consists of five components:
The components are: an action signature sig(A), a set of states states(A), a non-empty set of start states start(A) ⊆ states(A), a transition relation steps(A) ⊆ states(A) × acts(sig(A)) × states (A), satisfying that for every s ∈ states(A) and every input action a ∈ in(sig(A)) there exists s ∈ states(A) so that (s, a, s ) ∈ steps(A). Finally, part (A) is an equivalence relation, partitioning the set local (sig(A)) into at most countably many classes.
A run r of an I/O automaton A is a sequence r = s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 s 2 · · · a n s n or an infinite sequence r = s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 s 2 · · · , so that s 0 ∈ start(A) and for all i, (s i , a i+1 , s i+1 ) ∈ steps(A). For a finite run r = s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 s 2 · · · a n s n , the length of r, is the number of state occurrences, i.e., |r| = n + 1. For infinite runs r, we write |r| = ∞.
A finite run r of A is fair if for every class C of part (A), we have that no action of C is enabled in the final state of r. An infinite run r is fair if for every class C of part(A) then either r contains infinitely many events from C, or r contains infinitely many occurrences of states in which no action of C is enabled. 
The composition is the I/O automaton defined as follows.
2. states(A) = i∈I states(A i ). We uses to denotes elements of the Cartesian product. Ifs ∈ states(A) thens i refers to the i th component ofs.
start(
If A and B are compatible automata, we use also A × B to denote their composition. We give a brief example of I/O automata and composition. The following Channel automaton is a simplified version of an automaton that we shall use in the actual semantics. The channel is a one-way communication channel between two identities, transmitting values from V . The automaton is parametric in two principal identities, meaning that for any p, q ∈ P, Channel(p, q) is an I/O automaton (intend to model a FIFO communication channel that can p can use to send V -values to q). Fix any two p, q ∈ P, and consider the following data.
• The action signature sig(Channel(p, q)) = S is given by the following. We have int(S) = ∅, and acts
The signature is illustrated graphically in Figure 5 .
• states(Channel(p, q)) = V * , the set of finite sequences of elements from V . A state s = v 1 · v 2 · · · v n represents n messages in transit from p to q (sent in that particular order).
• start(Channel(p, q)) = (the empty sequence).
• steps(Channel(p, q)) is given by the following. For any state s ∈ V * and any v ∈ V , we have (s, send(p, q, v), s·v) ∈ steps (Channel(p, q) ). For any v 0 ∈ V and any non- (Channel(p, q) ).
• part (Channel(p, q) ) is the trivial partition where all recv (q, p, v) actions are in the same equivalence class.
We will often use a pseudo-language for specifying I/O automata. The language is similar to IOA [3, 4] , and its semantics should be clear. In the language, an automaton is given by specifying its signature, state, actions, transitions and partition. The state is given in terms of a collection of variables, for example, buffer : Seq[V ] := {} declares a variable "buffer" of type "sequences of values from the set V ," and initializes this variable to the empty sequence. The transitions are given in a precondition/effect-style, where the precondition represents the set of states in which the action is enabled. The effect is an imperative program, executed atomically, manipulating the state variables. The syntactic representation of the Channel(p, q) automaton is the following. composition A × Channel(p, q) is illustrated in Figure 6 . Notice that the composition has no input actions, but output actions {send (p, q, v) 
Bertsekas abstract asynchronous systems
A Bertsekas abstract asynchronous system (BAAS) is a general model of distributed asynchronous fixed-point algorithms. Many algorithms in concrete systems like message-passing or shared-memory systems are instances of the general model. Bertsekas has a convergence theorem that supplies sufficient conditions for a BAAS to compute certain fixed points. We describe the model and the theorem in this section.
BAAS. A Bertsekas Abstract Asynchronous System
) consisting of n sets X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , and n functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n , where for each i, f i : n j=1 X j → X i . Let X = n i=1 X i . We assume that there is a (partial) notion of convergence on X, so that some sequences (x i ) ∞ i=1 , x i ∈ X have a unique limit point, lim i x i ∈ X. We let f denote the product function f = f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n : X → X. The objective of a BAAS is to find a fixed point x * of f .
We can think each i ∈ [n] as a node in a network, and function f i is then associated with that node. Each node i has a current best value x i (which is supposed to be an approximation of x * i ), and an estimate x i = (x i 1 , x i 2 , . . . , x i n ) for the current best values of all other nodes. Occasionally node i recomputes its current best value, using the current best estimates, by executing the assignment
Once a node has updated its current value, this value is transmitted (by some means) to the other nodes, that (upon reception) update their estimates (e.g., x j i is updated at node j when receiving an update from node i).
Examples of BAAS's include many distributed optimization-, numericaland dynamic programming algorithms [1] .
BAAS runs. Let
with initial solution estimatex, is given by the following.
1. A collection of (update-time) sets (T i ) i∈ [n] . For each i, the set T i is a subset of N, and represents the set of times where node i updates its current value.
A collection of (value) functions (x
3. For each i ∈ [n], a collection of (estimate) functions (τ i j ) j∈ [n] , each of type τ i j : N → N, and each satisfying: for all t ∈ N,
We let x i (t) denote i's estimate (of the values of all nodes) at time t.
The estimates x i (t) are given by the estimate and value functions, as follows.
x i (t) = (x 1 (τ i 1 (t)), x 2 (τ i 2 (t)), . . . , x n (τ i n (t)))
Hence t − τ i j (t) can be seen as a form of transmission delay, as the current value of j at time t is x j (t), but node i only knows the older value x i (t) j = x j (τ i j (t)).
4. The value functions must satisfy the following requirements. If t ∈ T i then at time t, node i updates its value by applying f i to its current estimates. That is,
If t ∈ T i then no updates are performed (on x i ). That is,
Note that the property of the τ -functions implies that, at time 0, all nodes agree on their estimates, x i (0) = x j (0) =x for all i, j ∈ [n].
Definition 3.2 (Fairness).
We say that a run is finite if all the sets T i are finite. If a run is not finite, it is infinite. An infinite run r of a BAAS is fair if for each i ∈ [n]:
• the set T i is infinite; and
• whenever {t k } ∞ k=0 is a sequence of elements all in T i , tending to infinity, then also lim k→∞ τ i j (t k ) = ∞ for every j ∈ [n]. A finite run r of a BAAS is fair if the following holds. Let t * i = max T i , and let t * = max i∈[n] t * i + 1. Then r satisfies:
. When an infinite run is fair, each node is guaranteed to recompute infinitely often. Moreover, all old estimate values are always eventually updated. For finite runs, the fairness assumption means that for each i, at the last update of i, its estimate for each node j is equal to the final value computed by j. Proof. Let i ∈ [n] be arbitrary but fixed. We show that f i (x(t * )) = x(t * ) i . Since r is finite fair, we have:
). Now t * ≥ t * i + 1 and by the definition of t * i , for every t with t * i + 1 ≤ t ≤ t * we have t ∈ T i . Hence x i (t * ) = x i (t * i + 1). Putting it all together, we get
The asynchronous convergence theorem
The Bertsekas abstract asynchronous systems are a model of asynchronous distributed algorithms. The Asynchronous Convergence Theorem (ACT) (Proposition 6.2.1 of Bertsekas' book [1] ) is a general theorem which gives sufficient conditions for BAAS runs to converge to a fixed point of the product function f . The ACT applies in any scenario in which the socalled "Synchronous Convergence Condition" and the "Box Condition" are satisfied. Intuitively, the synchronous convergence condition states that if the algorithm is executed synchronously, then one obtains the desired result. In our case, this amounts to requiring that the "synchronous" sequence ⊥ n f (⊥ n ) · · · converges to the least fixed-point, which is true for continuous f . Intuitively, the box condition requires that one can split the set of possible values appearing during synchronous computation into a product ("box") of sets of values that appear locally at each node in the asynchronous computation.
We now recall the definition of the Synchronous Convergence Condition (SCC) and the Box Condition (BC) (Section 6.2 [1] ). Consider a BAAS with X = n i=1 X i , and f : X → X any function with f = f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n .
Definition 3.3 (SCC and BC). Let
and furthermore, if {y k } k∈N is a sequence which has a limit point lim k y k , and which satisfies y k ∈ X(k) for all k, then lim k y k is a fixed-point of f .
BC The sequence {X(k)} ∞
k=0 satisfies the Box Condition if for every k ≥ 0, there exist sets X i (k) ⊆ X i such that
The following Asynchronous Convergence Theorem gives sufficient conditions for a BAAS run to converge to the fixed point of its product function.
Theorem 3.1 (ACT, Bertsekas). Let
k=0 satisfies the SCC and the BC. Let r be any infinite fair run of B, with initial solution estimate x(0) ∈ X(0). Then, if {x(t)} t∈N has a limit point, this limit point is a fixed point of f .
An Operational Semantics
In this section we present the operational semantics of the basic policy language. This will be given by a semantic function · op mapping a collection Π of policies of the basic language to an I/O automaton Π op . We introduce also an "abstract" operational semantics, which is given by another semantic function · ob-abs mapping Π to a BAAS. The systems Π op and Π op-abs will correspond in a "simulation-like" manner: runs of Π op can be faithfully matched by corresponding runs of Π op-abs (in a formal sense, described later in this section).
· op translation, an operational semantics
We first provide the concrete operational semantics. Function · op maps a collection of trust policies from the basic language to an I/O automaton. The semantics uses two parameterized I/O automata: Channel(p, q, r) and IOTemplate(p, q, f ), where p, q, r ∈ P and f : (P → P → D) → D is a continuous function. The semantic function · op is given in Figure  7 and Figure 8 . The parameterized automata are described syntactically in Figure 9 and Figure 10 . A principal p is represented as the automaton π p op p,∅ which is the composition of a collection of automata IOTemplate(p, q, f pq ) for q ∈ P and where f pq (gts) = π p den gts q, i.e, policy π p 's entry for q. The component IOTemplate(p, q, f pq ), which we denote simply as "pq", is responsible for computing (or approximating) principal p's trust value for principal q, i.e., the value gts(p)(q).
The I/O automaton Π op is a composition, A × B, of two automata where A = p∈P π p op p,∅ represents the composition-automaton of each of the principals policies, and B = p,r,q∈P Channel(p, r, q) is a composition of channel automata. For p, r, q ∈ P, the channel automaton Channel(p, r, q) represent a reliable FIFO communication channel, and will be used by the automaton pq = IOTemplate(p, q, f pq ), to communicate trust-values of p about principal q to principal r.
The IOTemplate-automata from Figure 10 are designed to implement the following algorithm, described previously by Krukow and Twigg [6] .
An asynchronous algorithm. The asynchronous algorithm is executed in a network of nodes pq for p, q ∈ P. Each node pq allocates variables pq.t cur and pq.t old of type D, which will later record the "current" value and the last computed value. Each node pq has also a matrix,
Channel(p, r, q) Figure 7 : Operational semantics of the policy language. For a principalindexed collection of policies Π = (π p | p ∈ P), the semantics Π op is an I/O automaton. denoted by pq.gts, of type P → P → D. Initially, pq.t cur = pq.t old = ⊥ , and the matrix is also initialized with ⊥ . For any nodes pq and rs, when rs receives a message from pq (which is always a value in D), it stores this message in rs.gts(p)(q) (except the special case where rs = pq where this is unnecessary). Any node is always in one of two states: sleep or wake. All nodes start in the wake state, and if a node is in the sleep state, the reception of a message triggers a transition to the wake state. In the wake state any node pq repeats the following: it starts by assigning to variable pq.t cur the result of applying its function f pq to the values in pq.gts, i.e., node pq executes assignment pq.t cur := f pq (pq.gts). If there is no change in the resulting value (compared to the last value computed, which is stored in pq.t old ), it will go to the sleep state (unless a new message was received since f pq (pq.gts) was computed). Otherwise, if a new value resulted from the computation (i.e., if pq.t old = f pq (pq.gts)), this value is sent to all nodes.
In the I/O automata version of this algorithm, the sending of a message d from node pq to another node, say rs, is represented by the action send(p, r, q, d) (note this is independent of s). The message d i stored in the buffer of Channel(p, r, q) , and eventually retrieved by node rs, performing input-action recv(r, p, q, d) (note all nodes rs for s ∈ P perform this action simultaneously, reflecting that principal r is modelled by the entire collection (IOTemplate(r, s , f rs ) | s ∈ P)). Action eval(p, q) represents the node pq recomputing its current value. The fairness partition of IOTemplate(p, q, f pq ) ensures that the eval(p, q) action is always eventually executed once it is enabled. Similarly, send(p, r, q, pq.t cur ) is always eventually executed when variable pq.send (r) is true. 
Cause and effect
In the following, we establish some structure on runs of the operationalsemantics automaton. For a run r c of Π op , we define a "causality" function, cause rc , mapping each index k > 0 to a smaller index k . If cause r (k) = k > 0 we say that action a k causes action a k . For a (finite or infinite) run r c = s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 s 2 · · · of Π op , we write ActIndex (r c ) for the set {j ∈ N | 0 < j < |r c |} of action indexes of r c . Define the function cause rc : ActIndex (r c ) → N inductively.
cause rc (1) = 0 For any k ∈ N, define cause rc (k + 1) by cases.
• Case a k+1 = eval(p, q) for some p, q ∈ P. As we are not interested in "causes" of eval events, we simply define cause rc (k + 1) = 0.
• Case a k+1 = send(p, r, q, d) for some p, q, r ∈ P, d ∈ D. Note that since initially, pq.send(r) = false, there must exist some largest index j < k so that s j .pq.send(r) = false and s j+1 .pq.send (r) = true (since this is a pre-condition of a k+1 ). Then cause rc (k + 1) = j + 1. Note that a j+1 must be an eval(p, q) event, and that we must have s j .pq.t cur = s j+1 .pq.t cur , and s j+1 .pq.wake = true.
• Case a k+1 = recv(p, r, s, d recv(p, r, s, d 
(cause rc is defined on r 0 ∈ R 0 since r 0 < k + 1). Note that |S 0 | > |R 0 |. This follows from the fact that for each recv (p, r, s, d) action, there must be at least one previous occurrence of a send(r, p, s, d) action, and a k+1 = recv (p, r, s, d) . This, in turn, implies that S is non-empty. Now, define cause rc (k + 1) = min S Writing k = cause rc (k + 1), note that a k = send(r, p, s, d) . Note also that s k .rs.t cur = d, and s k .rs.send (p) = false.
We define a "dual" function of cause rc , called the "effect" function, and denoted effect rc . Function effect rc : ActIndex (r c ) → 2 ActIndex (rc) is defined as follows:
The following lemma establishes some simple properties of the cause rc function. • For every k ∈ ActIndex (r c ), cause rc (k) < k (which implies that ∀k ∈ effect rc (k). k < k ).
• Each send(p, r, q, d) action in r c is caused by a unique eval(p, q) action, and each recv(p, r, s, d) action in r c is caused by a unique send(r, p, s, d) action.
• The cause rc function is injective when restricted to recv actions. That is, for any indices k, k with k = k , if a k = recv(. . .) and a k = recv(. . .), then also cause rc (k) = cause rc (k ).
Proof. The first two items follow immediately from the definition. For the last item, let k < k with a k = recv(p, r, s, d) and a k = recv(p , r , s , d ).
Let j = cause rc (k) and j = cause rc (k ), then by the above, a j =  send(r, p, s, d) and a j = send(r , p , s , d ). Hence if (p, r, s, d) = (p , r , s , d ) then j = j . So assume that (p, r, s, d) = (p , r , s , d ) . We want to prove that cause rc (k) = cause rc (k ). recv(p, r, s, d) } and R 0 = {j | j < k , a j = recv(p, r, s, d)}. We have S 0 ⊆ S 0 and R 0 R 0 , in particular, k ∈ R 0 \ R 0 .
cause rc (k) = min(S 0 \ cause rc (R 0 )) cause rc (k ) = min(S 0 \ cause rc (R 0 )) Injectivity follows, as cause rc (k) ∈ cause rc (R 0 ).
The following lemma formalizes the fact that the channels are reliable, and act in a FIFO manner.
Lemma 4.3 (FIFO).
Let r c = s 0 a 1 s 2 · · · be a finite or infinite fair run of Channel(p, r, q) for p, r, q ∈ P. Suppose that a k = send(p, r, q, d) and send(p, r, q, d ) for some d, d ∈ D. If k ≤ k then there exists unique j, j with k < j and k < j , so that j ≤ j , a j = recv(r, p, q, d) , a j = recv(r, p, q, d ), cause rc (j) = k and cause rc (j ) = k .
Proof. Since a k = send(p, r, q, d) then we have s k .buffer = u · d, for some u ∈ D * . Let N = |u| ≥ 0, then by fairness, there must be N + 1 unique indices (k i ) N +1 i=1 , satisfying the following four points.
• a k i = recv(r, p, q, u i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N, = recv(r, p, q, d) , and
• for all l ∈ N with k < l < k N+1 and l = k i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N + 1, action a l is not a recv action, i.e., a l = recv(p, r, q, d 0 ) for all d 0 ∈ D.
We prove in the following that cause rc (k N +1 ) = k. recv(r, p, q, d) }, and note that k
we obtain, cause rc (r) = min(S r 0 \ cause rc (R r 0 )) = min(S k 0 \ R r 0 ) < k. Now, we have an injective function cause rc mapping the set R 0 to the set S k 0 , so |S k 0 | = |R 0 | implies that cause rc (R 0 ) = S k 0 . Hence, S 0 \ cause rc (R 0 ) = S 0 \ S 0 and since k = min(S 0 \ S 0 ), we have cause rc (k N +1 ) = k.
Similar reasoning applies to k , so let j, j be so that a j = recv (r, p, q, d) , k = cause rc (j), a j = recv (r, p, q, d ) and k = cause rc (j ). To show that j ≤ j , assume first that k > j, then because j > k , clearly j < j . So assume instead for some i ≥ 0 we have k i < k < k i+1 (writing k = k 0 ). Note that then s k .buffer = u i+1 u i+2 · · · u N ds d for some s ∈ D * , and hence, j = k N +1 > k N+1 = j.
Notice that by the above lemma, if a k = send(p, r, q, d) then uniqueness of j with cause rc (j) = k implies that effect rc (k) = {j}. By abuse of notation, we write effect rc (k) = j. Hence, cause rc (effect rc (k)) = k. This implies also that if a m = recv (r, p, q, d) then effect rc (cause rc (m)) = m. Lemma 4.4 (Cause and Effect). Let Π = (π p | p ∈ P) be a collection of policies, and let r c = s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 · · · be a finite or infinite fair run of Π op . The following properties hold of r c : 1. Assume that for some k ≥ 0, we have s k .pq.wake = true, then there exists a k > k so that a k = eval(p, q).
2. Assume that a k 0 = eval(p, q) and
Let k 1 > k be least with a k 1 = eval(p, q) (note, such an index must exist by the above). Then, for every r ∈ P there exists a unique k r with k 0 < k r < k 1 so that a kr = send (p, r, q, ) . Furthermore, a kr = send (p, r, q, d) and cause rc (k r ) = k 0 .
3. Assume that a k = send(p, r, q, d) and a k = send (p, r, q, d ) . Then, k < k implies cause rc (k) < cause rc (k ).
4.
Assume that a k = recv(r, p, q, d) and a k = recv (r, p, q, d ) . Then, k < k implies cause rc (k) < cause rc (k ).
Proof. Let r c = s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 · · · be a finite or infinite fair run of Π op . We prove each point separately.
1. Assume that s k .pq.wake = true. Assume first that for every r ∈ P we have s k .pq.send(r) = false. Then action eval(p, q) is enabled. Notice that this action stays enabled until a eval(p, q) event occurs.
Since {eval(p, q)} is an equivalence class, fairness of r c implies that there exists some k > k so that a k = eval(p, q). Now, suppose instead that for some r ∈ P we have s k .pq.send(r) = true. Then action send (p, r, q, d) is enabled for d = s k .pq.t cur , and notice that this action stays enabled until a send(p, r, q, d) event occurs. Since {send (p, r, q, c) | c ∈ D} is an equivalence class, and only send (p, r, q, d) is enabled in the class, fairness of r c means that for some k 0 > k we have a k 0 = send (p, r, q, d) , and hence s k 0 .pq.send (r) = false. Let k 0 be the least such index, and note that for all j with k ≤ j ≤ k 0 we have s j .pq.wake = true (as no eval(p, q) action can occur while pq.send(r) = true). Since this holds for all r, there must exist a k > k so that s k .pq.wake = true and for all r ∈ P we have s k .pq.send (r) = false, and we are done by the initial comment.
Notice that s k 0 .pq.wake = true, and let k 1 > k 0 be the (index of the) first occurrence of an eval(p, q) event after time k 0 . Notice that since no eval(p, q) event occurs in the interval (k 0 , k 1 ) we have s l .pq.t cur = d for all l ∈ [k 0 , k 1 ). Let r ∈ P be arbitrary. Notice that send (p, r, q, d) is enabled at time k 0 , and stays enabled until a send(p, r, q, d) action occurs. By fairness such an action must occur, so let k r > k 0 be the least index so that a kr = send (p, r, q, d) . Notice that after time k 0 , no eval(p, q) action can occur before a send (p, r, q, d) 
· op-abs translation, an abstract operational semantics
We also map a collection Π = (π p | p ∈ P) to a BAAS, in a similar way. In the rest of this paper, we shall not distinguish between [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and the set P × P, nor shall we distinguish between D n and P → P → D. Note that Π λ = f pq | q ∈ P | p ∈ P = f (hence a valued ∈ D n is a fixed point of f if-and-only-if it is a fixed point of Π λ ).
The notion of convergence of sequences in D n is the following. A sequence (d k ) ∞ k=0 has a limit iff the set {d k | k ∈ N} has a least upper bound in (D n , ), and in this case, lim kd k = kd k .
Correspondence of abstract and concrete operational semantics
The two translations · op and · op-abs are closely related: the latter can be viewed as an abstract version of the former. In fact, in the following we will map runs of Π op to "corresponding" runs of Π op-abs .
Correspondence of runs.
Let us map a (finite or infinite, fair or not) run r c = s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 s 2 · · · of the concrete I/O-automaton Π op to a run r a of the BAAS Π op-abs , called the corresponding run (of r c ), as follows.
1. For any p, q ∈ P, T pq is defined as {k − 1 | k ∈ N, a k = eval(p, q)}. That is, the update-times of pq are the indexes of pre-states of eval(p, q) actions in r c . Note that for (p, q) = (r, s) we have an empty intersection, T pq ∩ T rs = ∅.
2. For each p, q ∈ P, the function τ pq pq : N → N is given by the identity τ pq pq (t) = t. This reflects the fact that node pq always has an exact "estimate" of its own current value. This rule implies that x pq (t) pq = x pq (τ pq pq (t)) = x pq (t).
(a) Let k ≤ t be the largest, with the property that a k = recv(p, r, s, d) for some d ∈ D. If no such index exists, then τ pq rs (t) is defined as the largest j ≤ t with the property that for all j with 0 ≤ j ≤ j we have s j .rs.t cur = ⊥ . If such k exists, let k = cause rc (k). Note that a k = send(r, p, s, d) . (b) We then define k = cause rc (k ). Note that a k = eval(r, s), and that we must have s k .rs.t cur = d.
(c) Finally, define τ pq rs (t) to be the largest index j ≤ t with the property that for all j with k ≤ j ≤ j, also s j .rs.t cur = d. Note, in particular s j .rs.t cur = d.
Abstract state. For a run r a of Π op-abs and a time t ∈ N, we let state abs (r a , t) be the following (estimate-value) pair: state abs (r a , t) = (E abs , V abs ), where • E abs is the function of type P → P → (P → P → D), given by E(p)(q) = x pq (t).
• V abs is the function of type P → P → D, given by V (p)(q) = x pq (t).
Similarly, for a run r c = s 0 a 1 s 1 · · · of Π op , and an index 0 ≤ k < |r c |, we let state op (r c , k) be the following pair: state op (r c , k) = (E con , V con ), where • E con is the function of type P → P → (P → P → D), given by E con (p)(q) = s k .pq.gts.
• V con is the function of type P → P → D, given by V (p)(q) = s k .pq.t cur .
Let us call state op and state abs the "abstract state." The following lemma relates concrete and abstract runs via the abstract state. Proof. By induction in k. The base case k = 0 is immediate.
Inductive step. Assume that for all k ≤ k, state op (r c , k ) = state abs (r a , k ), where k + 1 < |r c |. Show that state op (r c , k + 1) = state abs (r a , k + 1).
• Case a k+1 = eval(p, q) for some p, q ∈ P. Since state op (r c , k) = state abs (r a , k), we get x pq (k) = s k .pq.gts. Hence, since k ∈ T pq , we get x pq (k + 1) = f pq (x pq (k)) = f pq (s k .pq.gts) = s k+1 .pq.t cur . Further, we have x pq (k+1) pq = x pq (k+1) = s k+1 .pq.t cur = s k+1 .pq.gts(p)(q). For all rs = pq, x pq (k + 1) rs = x pq (k) rs = s k .pq.gts(r)(s) = s k+1 .pq.gts(r)(s).
• Case a k+1 = send (p, q, s, v) . Notice that send-actions don't affect the abstract state: state op (r, k+1) = state op (r, k) = state abs (r, k) = state abs (r, k + 1).
the following. Assume there are infinitely many send-events in r c , and note that since P is finite, there must exist r, s, t ∈ P so that send(r, t, s, ) events occur infinitely often (i.o.) in r c . By The Lemma (2, 3) , cause rc maps the indexes of these send(r, t, s, ) events, injectively, to indexes k with a k = eval(r, s) and s k−1 .rs.t cur = s k .rs.t cur , hence, such indexes occur i.o. in r c . By The Lemma (2), also, send(r, p, s, ) events occur i.o. in r c , hence, by the FIFO Lemma, recv(p, . . .) events occur i.o. in r c . But this implies that pq.wake = true infinitely often, and hence by The Lemma (1), we have eval(p, q) infinitely often.
So let us prove that there are infinitely many send-events. Assume this is not the case, and let k be an arbitrary index so that there are no send events after k. Note that by The Lemma (2) it suffices to prove that there is some k > k so that a k = eval(u, v) and s k −1 .uv.t cur = s k .uv.t cur , for some u, v ∈ P. Now, because all message buffers are finite at time k, and no send events occur later than k, then there can be only finitely many recv-events after k. So let K ≥ k be arbitrary so that there are no recv-events after K.
By construction there can only be eval-events after K, but since r c is infinite there must also be some eval event with a change in the t cur variable (otherwise all wake variables eventually become false).
Now, let p, q, r, s ∈ P, and let (t j ) ∞ j=0 be a sequence tending towards infinity, and let K ∈ N be arbitrary but fixed. We show that there exists j so that τ pq rs (t j ) ≥ K. If (r, s) = (p, q) this is trivial as τ pq pq is the identity function. So assume this is not the case. We know that there are infinitely many eval(r, s) events in r c . There are three cases.
If there are no k with a k = eval(r, s) and s k .rs.t cur = s k+1 .rs.t cur . Then for all k ≥ 0 we have a k = recv(p, r, s, ) and s k .rs.t cur = ⊥ . Hence τ pq rs is the identity function, and we are done. If there are some but only finitely many k with a k = eval(r, s) and s k−1 .rs.t cur = s k .rs.t cur , let k 0 be the largest such, and let v = s k 0 .rs.t cur . Note that for all k ≥ k 0 we have s k .rs.t cur = v. Then by The Lemma (2) and the FIFO Lemma, let l be so that a l = recv (p, r, s, v) and cause rc (cause rc (l)) = k 0 . Now we get, τ pq rs (t) = t for all t ≥ l
Because of the correspondence between the abstract operational semantics and the concrete operational semantics, we can prove the main theorem by first proving that the abstract operational semantics "computes" the least fixed-point of the product function. To prove this, we first establish the following invariance property of the abstract system. Proposition 5.1 (Invariance property of · op-abs ). Let Π = (π p | p ∈ P ) be a collection of policies. Let r be any run of Π op-abs . Then, for every time t ∈ N and for every p, q ∈ P, we have • approximation: x pq (t) Π den ,
• increasing: x pq (t) f pq (x pq (t)), and
• monotonic: ∀t ≤ t.x pq (t ) x pq (t)
Proof. By induction in t.
Base. Since x pq (0) = (⊥ , ⊥ , . . . , ⊥ ), all three properties follow trivially.
Inductive step.
Proposition 5.2 (Convergence of · op-abs ). Let Π = (π p | p ∈ P ) be a collection of policies. Letd : P → P → D be an information approximation for Π λ . Let r be any fair run of Π op-abs with initial solution estimate x(0) =d. Then the sequence {x(t)} t∈N has a limit point, and lim t x(t) = lfp Π λ .
Theorem 5.1 (Correspondence of semantics). Let Π be any collection of policies, indexed by a finite set P of principal identities. Let r = s 0 π 1 s 1 π 2 s 2 · · · be any fair run of the operational semantics of Π, Π op . Let state op (r, k) = (E k , V k ), then we have
• {V k | k ∈ N} is a chain in (P → P → X, ).
• k∈N V k = Π den .
Proof. First, map r c to its corresponding run r a . This is a fair run of Π op-abs by Lemma 4.7. By Lemma 4.6, {x(t)} t∈N = {V k } k∈N , and by the Proposition 5.2 {x(t)} t∈N has a limit which is lfp Π λ = Π den .
